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AbstrAct: Castoriadis views the project of autonomy as central to both political action and 
philosophical thinking. although he acknowledges that the political project has retreated, 
he insists on its thinkability as a viable project. We argue that this insistence gives rise to an 
unresolved tension. specifically, Castoriadis’ substantive response to the question ‘what ought 
we to think?’, which he gives in terms of the pursuit of the philosophical project of autonomy, 
ultimately fails to recognise the unavoidable effect of the political project’s retreat on the thinker 
and this failure raises doubts as to whether Castoriadis’ own thinking has the potential to move 
beyond a merely journalistic style of critique, which he finds objectionable.
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according to Castoriadis,
[…] the object of philosophy is the question: What ought i, what ought we, to 
think—about being, about knowledge of Being, about “i”, about “we,” about our 
polity, about justice etc..1
our aim in this paper is to assess the implications of this formulation of the question for 
philosophy in the light of Castoriadis’ commitment to the project of autonomy. having 
been ‘born in and through the polis’ and being ‘part of the same movement which 
brought about the first democracies’, philosophy is, for Castoriadis, a ‘central element 
of the greco-Western project of individual and social autonomy’ (Castoriadis, 1991: 13-
15).2 for Castoriadis the project of autonomy ‘means that the collectivity, which can 
only exist as instituted, recognizes and recovers its instituting character explicitly, and 
questions itself and its own activities’ (Castoriadis, 1991: 20). Castoriadis insists on the 
viability of the radical imaginary creation of a society that is knowingly self-instituting 
     1. Cornelius Castoriadis, Philosophy Politics Autonomy: Essays in political philosophy, nY oxford: oxford 
university press, 1991: 25.
     2. for a discussion see suzi adams, ‘interpreting creation: Castoriadis and the birth of autonomy’, Thesis 
Eleven, 2005, 83: 25-41.
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in the sense that it creates and institutes its own norms, rather than receiving them 
from an extra-social source. Moreover, such a transformation of society from its current 
heteronomous mode of being is the work of individuals as members of ‘the anonymous 
collective’.3 the autonomous political action of the collective that can bring about a 
genuinely autonomous society is in turn constituted by ‘thoughtful doing, and political 
thinking’.4 Castoriadis thus attributes a similar role to autonomy as a mode of being in 
relation to both political action and the practice of genuine theorizing. 
granting Castoriadis’ insistence on the centrality of the project of autonomy for 
both political action and philosophical thinking, what must such thinking involve, how 
does it begin and how should it develop? We want to suggest that, while the intensity 
involved in Castoriadis’ elucidation of the subject matter of philosophy is powerful 
enough to render explicit the field and initial task for philosophical thinking (hereafter 
‘thinking’), paradoxically, in exposing the centrality of the question of what ought to 
be thought, it also reveals why this focus on the subject matter of philosophy does not 
exhaust the question of thought. at least implicitly and rather vaguely, Castoriadis 
shows some appreciation that the fundamental question of thinking points beyond its 
‘what’ formulation. nevertheless, precisely because the question “what ought we to 
think” is fundamental, his own formulation turns out to be rather limited and this in 
turn has certain negative implications for his particular response to the fundamental 
question. More specifically, we will argue: (1) that there is a tension in Castoriadis’ 
acknowledgement of the retreat of the political project of autonomy, on the one hand, 
and its thinkability as a viable project, on the other; and (2) that this tension remains 
unresolved in so far as Castoriadis fails to recognize the effects of the project’s retreat on 
the thinker who must be understood as the bearer of the place of the project’s retreat. 
in order to develop our argument in the first section we will examine Castoriadis’ 
claims regarding the task of the philosopher against the background of the terms 
that are implied by his formulation of the question for philosophy. then, through an 
examination of Castoriadis’ discussion of the retreat of the political project of autonomy, 
in the second section we will identify the contours of a Castoriadian response to the 
fundamental question that acknowledges what we call its ‘where’ and ‘when’ dimensions. 
here we will suggest that this acknowledgement also effectively commits the thinker 
to thinking the very (im)possibility of the autonomous collective as the more precisely 
defined subject matter for thinking.
after examining Castoriadis’ response to the question ‘what ought we to think?’, 
namely the project of collective autonomy, in terms of his response to the ‘where’ and 
‘when’ dimensions of the fundamental question for philosophy in the third and final 
     3. Cornelius Castoriadis, World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis and the Imagination, 
California: stanford university press, 1997: 84 (hereafter ‘Castoriadis, 1997b’); david ames Curtis ed. 
The Castoriadis Reader, oxford uk: Blackwell publishers, 1997: 322 (hereafter ‘Castoriadis, 1997a). for a 
discussion of the difference between Castoriadis’ conception of the ‘anonymous collective’ and the political 
‘autonomous collective’ in Castoriadis’ thought see andreas kalyvas, ‘the radical instituting power and 
democratic theory’ Journal of  the Hellenic Diaspora, 24(1), 1998: 9-29.
     4. Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of  Society, 1987: 373. 
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section of our paper will argue that Castoriadis’ acknowledgement of the retreat of the 
political project ultimately commits him to the view that the political retreat must be 
transformed into a philosophical retreat and this can be achieved when the retreat of the 
collective happens in the thinker, so to speak.
i
“What ought i, what ought we to think?” to be sure, when philosophical thinking 
emerges it seeks its proper subject matter. But the implication here is that genuine 
thinking always appears as if for the first time and thus encounters itself by asking the 
same fundamental question. of course the question arises anew in the context of the 
given social-historical moment. Castoriadis’ conception of philosophy, his response to 
the question of ‘what self-reflective activity is about’, is explicitly informed by the subject 
matter of his own philosophy, a philosophy of the social-historical that is formulated in 
part through his critical reading of the history of western philosophy (Castoriadis, 1991: 
19-20). from this perspective the ancient philosophers’ challenge is still very much with 
us today. thus the proper focus of philosophy is neither the heideggerian question of the 
meaning of being, nor the Cartesian practice of doubting, a practice that is undertaken 
by an insecure subjectivity overwhelmed by the instability and relativity of meanings. 
the focus of philosophy should not even be the kantian question of the conditions of 
possibility for knowledge. none of these approaches can serve to formulate the proper 
question for thinking in so far as this latter is in the primordial state of encountering 
itself and attempting to identify its mission and place in the modern epoch. instead 
the question, ‘what ought we to think?’ invokes an inquiry into fundamentals, which 
both springs from and points to a state of collective being shaped through the exercise 
of radical autonomous thinking and in relation to the thinker’s activity of thinking in 
connection with the current condition of humanity. indeed in focusing our attention on 
how the exercise of radical autonomy affects the very character of thinking, Castoriadis 
implies that the very asking of the question itself gives rise to a sceptical attitude toward 
the claim of any subject matter to be pre-given. in raising the question then, in seeking 
the proper subject matter of philosophy, the questioner is already at a distance from the 
subject-centred Cartesian tradition of piecemeal doubting; he/she encounters his/her 
thinking through the activity of having already rejected any predetermined grounding 
in some given subject matter. it is in this sense that for Castoriadis, ‘philosophy is a 
reflective activity that deploys itself both freely and under the constraint of its own past’ 
(Castoriadis, 1991: 17-18, our emphasis). 
With this observation in mind and before turning to Castoriadis’ response to the 
question as posed, let us consider the implied parameters of the question itself. firstly, 
in asking ‘what ought we to think’, and in so far as the question invites a response, our 
attention is inevitably drawn to that which matters, the significant.5 that is, on the face 
     5. We discuss Castoriadis’ failure to give sufficient attention to the genuine source of significance in our 
paper, ‘the time of radical autonomous thinking and socio-historical becoming in Castoriadis’.
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of it we are invited to think something like: ‘we ought to think what matters’. But, if 
we agree that thinking as thinking is the pure intentionality towards recognizing and 
embracing what matters, our response inevitably leads to further questions. Where, for 
instance, would thinking get its call, so to speak, to think what matters? in the absence 
of such a call, thinking would be at a loss; in seeking the subject matter for thinking, 
the thinker would be forced into a disoriented state of having to think prior to thinking. 
Whatever the idiosyncratic significance of such an effort for the thinker, in order for 
thinking to think what matters more broadly, for the collective, or universally in some 
suitable sense of this term, it must belong somehow to that which at the same time as 
informing thinking, is in a sense beyond the thinking in question given that it constitutes 
the object for thinking, the that which matters for thinking. so thinking must get its call 
to think from what matters itself. But now the relation we have just identified—of what 
matters as being beyond thinking—indicates clearly the question of a place for thinking 
as well as for what matters. it follows that thinking what matters, presupposes a relating 
to and acknowledgement of a ‘where’. We must accordingly supplement Castoriadis’ 
‘what’ question with a reference to the implied ‘where’ question: ‘What ought we to 
think and where ought we to be situated in order to think it?’ 
even this expanded version of the question, however, is still not broad enough 
to capture the full significance of the fundamental question for philosophy in the 
Castoriadian frame. as already noted, Castoriadis emphasises the social and historical 
situatedness of the thinker:
i cannot ignore the fact that my own thought, however, original i may deem it to 
be, is but a ripple, at best a wave, in the huge social historical stream which welled 
up in ionia twenty-five centuries ago. i am under the double imperative: think 
freely and to think under the constraint of history (Castoriadis, 1991: 19).
so we must add at least one further dimension: ‘What ought we to think? Where and 
when ought we to think it?’ But if the ‘what’, the ‘where’ and the ‘when’ of the question 
of philosophy are not givens for the autonomous thinker that Castoriadis aspires to be, 
then, following this approach the thinking in question cannot allow itself to be subject 
to the limits of the identitary logic and ontology that govern the inherited philosophical 
tradition. for Castoriadis, as we have argued elsewhere, inherited thought—this includes 
thinkers from plato to descartes, Marx and heidegger—is incapable of thinking by 
reference to the terms of an essentially indeterminate world.6
it follows that from Castoriadis’ perspective the thinker’s mode of  thinking, the ‘how’ 
of the activity of thought, is no less implicated in the formulation of the fundamental 
question for philosophy. 
from our preliminary exploration of Castoriadis’ formulation of the fundamental 
question we have arrived at a more complicated formulation, which we can refer to as 
‘the what-where-when-how question’. the ‘what’, ‘where’, ‘when’, and ‘how’ of thinking 
     6. t. nicolacopoulos and g. Vassilacopoulos, ‘the time of radical autonomous thinking and socio-
historical becoming in Castoriadis’. on the concept of essential indeterminacy see also Jeff klooger, 
Castoriadis: Psyche, Society, Autonomy, leiden, Boston: Brill: 2009.
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constitute four indispensable dimensions of the question that activates genuine thinking. 
they are unavoidably implicated in the task that Castoriadis assigns the philosopher 
qua philosopher, namely ‘the task of thinking what is to be thought’ (Castoriadis, 1987: 
222). taking this multidimensional question as the question for thinking, in the sense 
of the philosophical question that opens the field of radical autonomous (self)reflection 
in Castoriadis’ terms, enables us to examine Castoriadis’ response in the light of the 
awareness that: ‘the challenge for thinking is to think what matters in a manner that 
matters in a place and time that matter.’ (in the remainder of this paper we leave aside 
the examination of Castoriadis’ response to the ‘how’ dimension of the fundamental 
question.)
Before proceeding to examine Castoriadis’ response, one more observation is in 
order concerning the terms in which Castoriadis raises the fundamental question for 
philosophy. We noted above that if we are to think what matters in a manner that 
matters then our thinking must somehow belong to what is to be thought; it must be 
activated by and in it as the thinking that itself matters. We might say that thinking 
is the intensification, the deepening or expansion of this very belonging, which is 
articulated by the ‘what-where-when-how’ of thinking. if so, then the ‘what-where-
when-how question’ already presupposes an affirmative answer to the prior question: 
‘ought we to think at all?’ (hereafter ‘the ‘ought’ question’). an affirmative answer to 
the ‘ought’ question is implied by the very act of asking the ‘what’ question. that is, to 
ask Castoriadis’ question is to imply a response to the ‘ought’ question; it is to position 
oneself in relation to a single affirmative answer. the ‘ought’ question is unavoidably 
prior because, unlike the ‘what-where-when-how’ question, it invokes the singular 
being of the thinker and his/her relation to what matters. this is the fundamental pre-
condition for the activation of thinking as that whose questioning is concerned with 
what matters in a manner that matters. in other words, the ‘ought’ question affirms 
genuine thinking as that of the impersonal in the personal and thus presupposes the 
singularity of the thinker as a field of commitment and associated willingness to think 
in a way that takes the thinker’s political and philosophical commitment beyond its 
grounding in a strictly personal willing. that is, it situates the thinker in the happening 
of the radical affirmation of his significant singularity qua participant of the collective. 
one implication of this is that, as Castoriadis acknowledges, the activity of the thinker 
cannot justifiably remain within the limits of a pure decisionism.7
so thinking and its questioning presuppose the situatedness and emergence of the 
singularity of the thinker in what matters, or more precisely, they presuppose the singular 
subject’s transformation into one who matters qua thinker precisely because this is what it 
would mean for one’s thinking to belong to what matters. so what matters also has the 
power to transform the singular subject into one who matters as a thinker and who is in 
turn empowered, in this capacity of a significant thinker, to transform what matters into 
a subject matter for thinking. an implied affirmative response to the ‘ought’ question 
     7. see andreas kalyvas, ‘the radical instituting power and democratic theory’. see also our ‘the time of 
radical autonomous thinking and socio-historical becoming in Castoriadis’.
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gives rise to what we will refer to as ‘the committed thinker’, the one who emerges in his/
her capacity as already associated with what matters in the appropriate way. in focusing 
his/her thinking on developing a response to the what-where-when-how question, the 
committed thinker is already claimed by what matters and is on the way to thinking 
in this very capacity. the commitment, ‘yes, we must think’ thus frames Castoriadis’ 
fundamental question accordingly: ‘since we ought to think (what matters), what ought 
we to think and where, when and how ought we to think it?’
so far we have suggested that in recognizing Castoriadis’ aspiration to be as 
a committed thinker, we can attribute to him an affirmative response to the ‘ought’ 
question, which is implied by a certain formulation of the ‘what’ question, a view about 
what is appropriate as the subject matter of philosophy. Being claimed by what matters 
provides thinking with its significance because to think is to recognize the belonging of 
the thinker’s singularity to what matters. Being claimed as a thinker by what matters, 
one is posited as a significant thinker, one who receives the call to think and hence as 
already positioned to think what matters in the appropriate place and time. if, however, 
what matters does indeed render the thinker as significant—if what matters claims the 
thinker and his/her activity as belonging to what matters—then there is a sense in 
which this relation already provides thinking with its subject matter, including the place, 
time and mode of its happening. that is, if and when thinking is to take up the challenge 
to think, it would already appear to have been drawn to do so, not by awareness of 
the fundamental questions in the abstract but by the answers, which they elicit. this 
is why, in spite of any appearances to the contrary, Castoriadis’ prior commitment to 
the political project of autonomy does not thereby commit his thinking to treating the 
project of autonomy as a given. When, for example Castoriadis inists that:
it is as political, and not philosophical, ideas that autonomy, […] the creativity of the 
masses, what today i would have called the irruption of the instituting imaginary 
in and through the activity of the anonymous collective, made their appearance in 
my writings (Castoriadis, 1997a: 371-372, our emphasis).
Castoriadis could be charged with the criticism that he takes for granted the political 
project of autonomy. But this would be a mistake. although his formulation of the 
question for philosophy follows from and as a development of his commitment to the 
political project of autonomy, from the perspective we are exploring, the question 
that the thinker raises comes after the answer as a way of reminding one that the real 
challenge springs from the answer which must be thinkingly articulated. in other words, 
the thinker is already familiar with the answer, albeit as the project of autonomy to be 
thinkingly elaborated. let us turn now to Castoriadis’ response to the ‘what’ question.
as already suggested, in Castoriadis’ case the combined effect of what we referred to 
above as the ‘ought’ and the ‘what’ questions is the emergence of the thinker as one who 
is committed to the project of autonomy. Castoriadis’ trajectory has been consistently 
informed by an unwavering commitment to the radical imaginary creation of society 
as explicitly self-instituting. as he affirms at the conclusion of The Imaginary Institution of  
Society, the radical transformation of society is something:
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which we are aiming at because we will it and because we know that others will it 
as well, not because such are the laws of history, the interests of the proletariat or 
the destiny of being (Castoriadis, 1987: 373).
from Castoriadis’ perspective this sort of radical willing is the only genuine self-presencing 
that the singular subject can enact, provided that he/she does so as a participant in 
the political collective. When thinking, understood as ‘thoughtful doing and political 
thinking’, is genuinely informed by these two aspects—the subject’s prior commitment 
and by the mutual informing of the individual and the collective—it functions as ‘society’s 
thinking as making itself ’ precisely because society’s transformation from heteronomy 
to autonomy ‘concerns social doing—and so also politics, in the profound sense of the 
term—the doing of men and women in society, and nothing else’. (Castoriadis, 1987: 
373). for Castoriadis, it is this sort of autonomous, yet mostly implicit, transformative 
becoming that the committed thinker is called upon to elucidate in the appropriate 
ontological-political terms, the terms of creation/destruction of eidos or form as a 
response to otherness (Castoriadis, 1997b: 399-400).
the committed thinker who embraces the project autonomy must also engage in 
the radical critique of heteronomous society, a critique that exposes antinomies and takes 
one beyond the given state of affairs and the ideological distortions characteristic of the 
heteronomous modes of being with which humanity has been associated for the most 
part. Because the heteronomous societies, which have dominated human history, have 
been instituted ‘in and through the closure of meaning’, the work of both philosophy and 
democratic politics is the breaking of such closure: 
democracy is the project of breaking the closure [of meaning imposed by 
heteronomous modes of being] at the collective level. philosophy, creating self-
reflecting subjectivity, is the project of breaking the closure at the level of thought 
(Castoriadis, 1991: 20).8
Moreover, for those living in modern western societies the radical critique of their own 
heteronomous societies/modes of being is possible, through history’s breaking of the 
closure of meaning within western modernity. as a result, 
[p]artially open societies have emerged, together with self-reflective individuals. 
the main carriers of this new historical creation were politics as collective 
emancipatory movement and philosophy as self-reflecting, uninhibitedly critical 
thought, […] a new type of human being: reflective and deliberating subjectivity. 
and this is what allows us to take some distance from our own society’ (Castoriadis, 
1997a: 336-337).
for Castoriadis, then, just as in political activity or social doing, so too in philosophical 
thinking, critique takes place as the radical imaginary creation/destruction of self-
reflective subjectivities. in order to be effective, 
Critique entails a distance relative to the object; if philosophy is to go beyond 
     8. for a recent discussion of the significance of closure in Castoriadis’ theory see Jeff klooger, ‘plurality 
and indeterminacy: revisiting Castoriadis’ overly homogeneous conception of society’, European Journal of  
Social Theory, 2011: 1-17.
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journalism, this critique presupposes the creation of new ideas, new standards, 
new forms of thought that establish this distance (Castoriadis, 1997b: 36).
the task of elucidating new ideas, standards and forms—the task in other words of 
elaborating one’s response to the fundamental question—cannot be undertaken from 
the perspective of some neutral observer, given that new forms are themselves rooted in 
the human condition; they are always a response to otherness, what Castoriadis refers 
to as the ‘Chaos, abyss, groundlessness’ of the world (Castoriadis, 1997b: 314). this is 
the case even for the more abstract philosophical questions.9 such questions can only be 
asked appropriately when they are informed by the thinker’s unwavering commitment, 
as is evidenced, for example, by love for the polity. accordingly, the committed thinker 
aspires to taking up two viewpoints simultaneously. for Castoriadis, ‘the two animals 
of the thinker are the eagle and the snake; he himself is a flying eagle and a creeping 
snake’.10 on the one hand, like the eagle, the committed thinker strives to maintain 
a distance from the subject matter of thinking but, on the other, as karagiannis and 
Wagner (2012) note, because events belong to their era, ‘when striving to reflect upon 
them, we too, belong precisely to the same era’ (karagiannis and Wagner, 2012: 2). 
anything less results in journalistic philosophy, a non-committed pseudo-reading of 
supposed facts that presumes that the thinker is not implicated in any deep way. 
ii
let us grant for the purposes of our discussion: that the project of autonomy—
the creation of explicitly self-instituting society—is the proper subject matter for the 
committed thinker; that the thought in question—autonomous thinking—also belongs 
to such a (partially open) society, or to the collective, rather than to the thinker in his/
her uniqueness; and that the thinker’s critical distance from the heteronomy of his/
her society’s mode of being is made possible in and through his/her activity as a self-
reflecting subjectivity and creator of new ideas. this approach permits us to ask the 
question, in the light of the discussion so far: ‘when and where is the autonomous 
collective manifested in the critical thought of the thinker as that which matters?’ to 
put the same question in a different way: ‘how does Castoriadis address the ‘where’ and 
‘when’ dimensions of the fundamental question for thinking?’ ‘What is the topos of the 
response he offers?’ 
We want to suggest next that we can identify the contours of a response to the 
‘where’ and ‘when’ aspects of the question for thinking in Castoriadis’ discussion of the 
situation of the fate and prospects of the political project of autonomy in the ‘modern’ 
period. in ‘the retreat from autonomy: postmodernism as generalized conformism’11 
Castoriadis discusses the prospects for the realization of the project of autonomy in the 
     9. see for example, Castoriadis’ discussion of the concept of time in ‘time and Creation’, 1997b: 374-404.
     10. Cited in nathalie karagiannis and peter Wagner, ‘What is to be thought? What is to be done? the 
polyscopic thought of kostas axelos and Cornelius Castoriadis’, European Journal of  Social Theory, 2012: 13 
footnote 1.
     11. Castoriadis, 1997b: 32-46.
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context of a diagnosis of the modern period, which he defines in terms of:
the conflict, but also the mutual contamination and entanglement, of two 
imaginary significations: autonomy, on the one hand, unlimited expansion of 
“rational mastery”, on the other’ (Castoriadis, 1997b: 37). 
as regards the fate and prospects of the project of autonomy in the last two centuries, he 
concludes that this period: 
has proved the radical inadequacy […] of the programs in which it [the project of 
autonomy] had been embodied […] that the demonstration of this inadequacy in 
actual historical fact is one of the roots of present political apathy and privatization 
hardly needs stressing. for the resurgence of the project of autonomy, new political 
objectives and new human attitudes are required. (Castoriadis, 1997b: 43).
here Castoriadis identifies the failure of the political project of autonomy with the 
shortcomings of the various political programs that have embodied it over time. But a 
resurgence of the project is not just a matter of calling for participation in more viable 
political programs. in acknowledging the retreat of the political project of autonomy, 
Castoriadis does not also claim to identify any viable political program for the project’s 
re-activation. indeed, if such genuine options were still available within the modern 
heteronomous world of global capitalism, one would rather be focused on the strictly 
political question of how best to exploit them. Castoriadis insists that the demand upon 
the committed thinker is to create ‘new political objectives’. here the emphasis appears 
to be on the question: ‘what are we to do?’ But this is the question that follows from 
‘what are we to think?’ (Castoriadis, 1991: 25). it is the question for the thinker qua 
activist. nevertheless, paradoxically in the light of the retreat that he recognizes, we 
can infer that given Castoriadis’ recognition of the gravity and the extent of the failure 
of the political programs to date, even reflecting upon the creation of new political 
programs appears premature. so, the challenge arising for the thinker qua philosopher, 
the challenge for the thinker in thinking autonomy philosophically, is to follow through 
the implications of acknowledging the absence of any visible options for a re-activation 
of the political project. ultimately, this is the social-historical context that gives rise to 
the challenge that the committed thinker of autonomy must face. Being committed to 
the political project in the current conditions, one must thinkingly create the (idea of the) 
autonomous collective, the social-historical gathering of free individuals as creators of 
their society, and this thinking must be enacted as integral to the realization of the 
project of autonomy itself. 
to repeat, Castoriadis situates this philosophical task of thinking autonomy, not 
just within the context of the political project’s retreat but at the very historical moment 
when such retreat has confirmed the absence of any visible political alternatives. it 
would seem then that the depth and the extent of the political failure forces the thinker 
to ask the philosophical question of the possibility as such of the project of autonomy. 
Castoriadis seems to acknowledge as much when at the conclusion of the Imaginary 
Institution of  Society he dismisses as ‘fictive’ the suggestion that the project of autonomy 
might be impossible:
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as far as our eyes can see, nothing allows us to affirm that a self-transformation of 
history such as this is impossible; no place—except the fictive and finally incoherent 
non-place of identitary logic-ontology—exists where the one who could assert this 
could possibly stand (Castoriadis, 1987: 373.
What is interesting to note here is that he distinguishes between the ‘place/non-place’ of 
autonomy and identitary logic-ontology respectively. these two modes of thought are 
not contrasted in the abstract. rather, they belong to two different ways of experiencing 
the social-historical gathering that situates them respectively in their ‘place’ and 
‘non-place’. that is, in the current historical moment, the imaginary significations of 
autonomy and the unlimited expansion of rational mastery are respectively related to 
the collapse of the project of autonomy and to the triumph of heteronomy. nevertheless, 
despite the appearance that the project of rational mastery has been victorious over that 
of autonomy and just when history shows itself to be resistant to self-transformation, 
Castoriadis insists that it is the thinking of autonomy that is appropriately placed to 
affirm this possibility. 
But if, as we have argued above, the thinking in question must be an integral part 
of the project of autonomy then it must be integral to the project’s historical collapse. 
this raises the question: ‘what is the place of a thinking that is sufficiently empowered to 
affirm the meaning and possibility of the project of autonomy despite history’s apparent 
verdict?’ it seems that the only available historically informed place from which to 
undertake the autonomous thinking of autonomy is the site of the very failure of the 
project itself. Where other than at the site of the project’s retreat and, hence, of the 
associated acknowledgement of the project of autonomy as having retreated, might the 
thinker situate himself/herself in order to enact the philosophical project? if the thinker 
is to elucidate the very meaning of the possibility (or impossibility) of autonomy as such 
he/she must do so at the site of the complete failure of all empirical possibilities for the 
radical emancipation of humanity that the last two centuries have witnessed. for it is 
here that the committed thinker must aspire to encounter the autonomous collective as 
such. 
the place of the retreat of the autonomous collective is a place in which it becomes 
possible for the gathering to take place, so to speak, as something not reducible to a mere 
empirical observation about failed political programs. as such it would no longer be 
rendered invisible through its identification with the various historically failed political 
programs. Moreover, it is at this point that the committed thinker might face the most 
radical of historical challenges to the project of autonomy, namely the possibility of 
having to affirm the impossibility of history’s radical self-transformative capacity.
iii
so far we have argued that the thinker must ultimately respond to the challenge of 
history’s apparent verdict—the claim that the project of autonomy is impossible—in 
so far as he, himself, is a politically committed bearer of this project and is therefore 
toula niColaCopoulos and george VassilaCopoulos 31
implicated in the project’s retreat. next we want to argue that it is precisely at this point, 
where Castoriadis acknowledges the gravity of the retreat from the standpoint of the 
thinker qua political activist, that his thinking falls short of the demands of the scope of 
the fundamental question for thinking. firstly, the thinker of the project of autonomy who 
enacts its thinkability and, hence, demonstrates the justifiedness of its possibility, cannot 
simply refer descriptively to the political retreat of autonomy independently and prior 
to any acknowledgement of the need for a philosophical explanation of the empirical 
phenomenon. for this would be to reduce the difference between the thinker who affirms 
the possibility of autonomy and the one who rejects this possibility to two different 
interpretations of one and the same phenomenon—the fact of the project’s historical 
failure—rather than to insist, as Castoriadis does, on a crucial difference between them 
in terms of the genuine place/fictive non-place distinction that he makes. secondly, 
because Castoriadis takes his thinking to be integral to the project of autonomy in that it 
is itself an autonomous thinking, the project must be able to supply the justification for such 
thinking, and, at the same time, such thinking must be able to affirm the possibility of 
the political project. in other words, these two aspects must be mutually informing. the 
combination of Castoriadis’ philosophical approach and his political commitment—the 
commitment to the autonomous collective as the proper subject matter of thinking—
must make it possible for him to acknowledge the full scope of the question of thinking 
and, for present purposes, to specify the ‘when and ‘where’ aspects of this question. 
Within Castoriadis’ discourse that the thinking of autonomy is non-fictive in the sense 
that it has a genuine place must mean that its appropriate place within the project of 
autonomy is the very place within which the thinker encounters the pure possibility of its 
thinkabiltiy. this is why Castoriadis cannot just declare the justifiedness of the project; 
just as politically he must position himself to practice autonomy effectively, so too qua 
thinker he must do position himself to act thinkingly. the very meaning of thinking 
autonomously is at issue here.
next we want to suggest that the appropriate response to the ‘where’ question holds 
that awareness of the political retreat must be transformed into a philosophical retreat and 
this can be achieved when the retreat of the collective happens in the thinker, so to speak. 
that is the thinker has to make the retreat happen in himself as the thinking of the 
autonomous collective. this is the only way to make the thinking in question that of the 
collective, which is the retreating gathering in the sense we have explained. We might 
say that in order to raise the question of the possibility of the autonomous collective as 
such, the gathering must retreat in its retreat. this is a second level of retreat that is itself 
implied by Castoriadis’ acknowledgement of the retreat of the project of autonomy, the 
first level of retreat that he identifies in the failed political programs together with the 
absence of visible viable alternatives. let us explain.
first, having retreated through the failure of specific political programs the 
autonomous collective must be liberated from being identified with such particular 
manifestations and the associated defeats. this is necessary precisely because the 
historical and theoretical verdict of the impossibility of autonomy implicates autonomy 
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as such and not merely the specific failed programs. second, because the thinker is 
called up to affirm the justifiedness of the possibility of autonomy as such it will not 
suffice to challenge the verdict of history by elaborating another political program for 
the advancement of autonomy. to address the issue of whether the impossibility of 
autonomy can be justified theoretically, and not just as an inferred conclusion from the 
specific historical defeats of political programs, calls for a consideration of whether those 
failures are not the result of the impossibility of the project itself. But in such a case it is 
the project of autonomy as such that must be disassociated from its particular historical 
manifestations. 
now given that the experience of the project of autonomy is situated in the project’s 
retreat via its association with the failed programs and awareness of the absence of 
viable alternatives, to thinkingly retrieve the project as such is to acknowledge the 
operation of what we referred to above as the ‘second level of retreat’, namely that from 
any and all specific programs. that is, in order to fully open himself to the challenge 
of the categorical verdict of history, Castoriadis must retrieve from history that which 
history has already brought forth, namely the question of the impossibility of autonomy 
as such as something over and above the specific/failed political programs. the only 
place available to the thinker in which to pursue the encounter of autonomy as such is 
the topos of retreat. this then is the place that the thinker must radicalize if the project 
of autonomy is to be resituated beyond the heteronomous spaces associated with the 
verdict of history. 
if the above analysis is correct then it would appear that in order to recapture the 
project of autonomy philosophically, or, in its own pure possibility, the only option for 
the committed thinker is to make the project of autonomy retreat from the very spaces 
of the first retreat. from this perspective, to be a thinker is to treat one’s thinking as the 
activity of the autonomous collective, which, in its retreating from the retreat of the 
political project, gathers itself in its own thinking activity and in doing so gives rise to its 
own historical possibility, albeit as visionary. so it is by facing the challenge of enacting 
this second level of retreat that the thinker enacts his/her autonomy qua thinker or, in 
other words, he/she becomes the thinker of the autonomous collective.
if, as Castoriadis appears to acknowledge, the political possibilities for the re-
activation of the project of autonomy are currently non-existent, then in seeking thinkingly 
to affirm the possibility of re-activating the project of autonomy, the thinker must hold 
together the gathering in its retreat. for it is this sort of radicalization of the retreat of the 
project that immanently disengages the investigation of the pure possibility of autonomy 
from that of the available political possibilities for the project’s resurgence. Within such a 
framework, the very retreating of the autonomous collective is itself lost from view. after 
all, in attempting to engage the very retreatingness of the autonomous collective, for the 
reasons explained above, the thinker cannot simply identify this aspect of the gathering 
with the weaknesses of the failed programs. nor, however, can he identify the collective’s 
retreatingness with anything like the thinker’s anticipation qua activist of meaningful 
future opportunities for the resurgence of the political project. for, to do so would be to 
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render meaningless the task of thinking the project’s reactivation. 
it follows that the thinker can encounter the autonomous gathering as the subject 
matter of thinking only in the spaces of the gathering’s unconditional retreat. in other 
words, since there is no adequate point of comparison between the state of the retreat 
of the project and the possibility of overcoming the retreat via the resurgence of a future 
program, the fact of the radical absence of possibilities for a future resurgence of the 
retreating gathering not only renders the latter invisible giving rise to a second level 
of retreat. it also calls upon the thinker to recognise his/her own being as the place of 
the happening of this second level of retreat. ultimately, the awareness of the absence 
of empirical possibilities for the project’s reactivation must lead the thinker to situate 
himself/herself in this relation in order to enable him/her to think the pure possibility 
of the reactivation of the project of autonomy. it is in this sense that the retreating 
gathering must retreat in the thinker. it is only through the thinker’s self-transformation 
into such a place of thinking the autonomous collective in its retreatedness that thinker 
might hope to enact the possibility of the autonomous collective or, in other words, to 
justifiably reject the claim that the project of autonomy has been historically eliminated.
in the light of the above analysis and despite his best efforts, Castoriadis’ recognition 
of the retreat of the project of autonomy appears as a merely journalistic intervention 
of the kind that he objects to, rather than as critique in the mode that he advocates. By 
limiting himself to what we identified above as the first level of retreat of the political 
project of autonomy, Castoriadis confines himself to the perspective of ‘the creeping 
snake’and thus gives up the opportunity to engage with the project as the project of 
thinking. he merely reports on the rather obvious fact, that of the project’s political 
retreat, without however relating to this retreat as the place of dwelling of the thinker, 
that is, as the genuine non-fictive place of the autonomous collective and thus as the topos 
in which the autonomous gathering might be retrievable from the spaces of its historical 
rejection. 
